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Some Current Issues in Church
and State
Leo Pfeffer
[The author maintains that the "wall of separation between
church and state," which many had thought to be crumbling,
has again been made whole by the Supreme Court. Analyzing
the Court's decisions in the Sunday law and religious oath-tak-
ing cases of last term in the light of the religious or secular
nature of the issues involved, he concludes that the Court has
reaffirmed its earlier broad interpretation of the first amend-
ment. Suggesting that the establishment and free exercise
clauses of that amendment are really "co-extensiv e and correla-
tive" ideas, the author examines from this viewpoint the con-
stitutional problems raised by federal aid to parochial schools
and by religious instruction in public schools.-Ed.]
THE MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The first amendment' was added to the Constitution in 1791, but it
was not until more than a century and a half later that the Supreme
Court felt called upon to provide a definitive interpretation of the amend-
ment's ban on laws respecting
an establishment of religion.
Tu AUTHOR (B.S.S., College of the City of an establishmentsof rion
New York, J.D., New York University) is n 1947, in Everson v. Board of
General Counsel of the American Jewish Con- Education,2 and in the follow-
gress and a member of the New York and ing year, in People ex rel. Mc-
United States Supreme Court Bars. Collum . Board of Edcation,'
the Court specifically inter-
preted the amendment as barring all aid to religion and as erecting a
wall of separation between church and state. In both cases the Court
interpreted the amendment (made applicable to the states by the four-
teenth) in the following comprehensive language:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof... "
2. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding transportation to parochial schools at public expense).
3. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (barring religious instruction in public schools).
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him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organization
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separa-
tion between Church and State."
4
In Everson this paragraph was no more than dictum, since the hold-
ing of the case was that the amendment was not violated by the statute
providing for payment of transportation to parochial schools out of tax-
raised funds. For that reason it attracted little attention. In McCollum,
however, it was decisive and required the invalidation of the assailed pro-
gram of religious instruction within the public schools. It was after Mc-
Collum that this definitive interpretation of the establishment clause be-
came subject to considerable criticism and attack, some of it quite in-
temperate, as a misreading of history and a distortion of the intent of the
framers of the amendment.5 It was not, these critics contended, the pur-
pose of the first amendment to divorce religion from government or to
impose neutrality between believers and non-believers, but only to meet
in a practical way the problems raised by the existence of a multiplicity
of sects. This was done by requiring the government to be neutral as
among these sects and forbidding it to favor one at the expense of the
others. The amendment was not intended to bar the government from
aiding or supporting religion and religious institutions so long as the aid
and support is granted equally and without preference to some faiths or
discrimination against others. In effect, the amendment was intended as
a sort of "equal protection" clause among religious groups.
The proof of this, according to the critics of the Court's interpreta-
tion in Everson and McCollum, was to be found in the history of our
country and in the society about us. Throughout its history, our govern-
ments, national and state, have co-operated with religion and shown
friendliness to it. God is invoked in the Declaration of Independence'
and in practically every state constitution. Sunday, the Christian Sabbath,
is universally observed as a day of rest. The sessions of Congress and of
the state legislatures are invariably opened with prayer, in Congress by
4. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 16 (1947); People ex rel. McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948).
5. See inter many alia: O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THnE CONSTITUTION
passim (1949); BRADY, CONFUSION TWICH CONFOUNDED passim (1955); Corwin, The
Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1949); Murray,
Law or Prepossession?, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 23 (1949); Statement of National Catho-
lic Welfare Conference, N. Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1948, p. 63, col. 2.
6. Though not mentioned at all in the Constitution.
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chaplains who are employed by the federal government. We have chap-
lains in our armed forces and in our penal institutions. Oaths in courts
of law are administered through the use of the Bible. Public officials
take an oath of office ending with "so help me God." Religious institu-
tions are tax exempt throughout the nation. Our Pledge of Allegiance
declares that we are a nation "under God." Our national motto is "In
God We Trust," which is inscribed on our currency and our postage
stamps.
Four years of this intense criticism was followed by the Court's deci-
sion in Zorach v. Clauson.' Whether a causal relationship existed be-
tween that decision and the campaign of criticism is a matter for specula-
tion on the part of historians of the Court. It seemed dear that the
language used by Justice Douglas, if not the holding itself, manifested a
discreet withdrawal from the forward position taken in Everson and Mc-
Collua. The holding itself was quite narrow: that McCollum did not
bar releasing children for off-school religious instruction where the pub-
lic school in no way participated in that instruction or did anything other
than adjust its schedule so as to accommodate the religious needs of the
children.
The apparent retreat from McCollu was found in the language.
'We are," said Justice Douglas speaking for six of the nine members of
the Court, "a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being." The first amendment "does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of Church and State." It requires only that
"there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other."
True enough, the opinion expressly stated: "We follow the McCol-
lum case," and stated further: "Government may not finance religious
groups nor undertake religious instruction... ," a statement hardly con-
sistent with any interpretation of the first amendment other than that of
Everson-McColua. But these statements were largely overlooked, and
there was undoubtedly a good deal of support for the view expressed by
Professor Paul Kauper that "all students of this subject may well agree
that Zorach for all practical purposes overruled McCollua. "  This was
so particularly in view of the fact that in Zorach the Court apparently de-
liberately refrained from reiterating - as it had done in McCollum -
the definitive interpretation of the amendment set forth in Everson in the
paragraph beginning, "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First
Amendment means at least this ......
To what extent Zorach actually manifested a repudiation of the basic
interpretation of the Everson-McCollua cases and to what extent this
7. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
8. Kauper, Church, State and Freedom: A Review, 52 Mici. L. REv. 829, 839 (1954).
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view of Zorach reflected wish-fulfillment9 need not now be considered.
Two decisions handed down in the past term of the Court make it dear
- at least to the extent that anything can be clear in constitutional law
- that the Everson-McCollum broad interpretation of the establishment
dause is still very much alive.
In the first of these decisions, McGowan v. Maryland," Chief Justice
Warren, speaking for six members of the Court in a decision upholding a
state Sunday law, went out of his way to do what was not done in Zorach
- reiterate verbatim the Everson-McCollum definitive paragraph." And
Justice Douglas used the occasion of his dissent to explain his statement
in Zorach that "we are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being." Its purpose was to indicate that the "Puritan influence
helped shape our constitutional law and our common law" in that it "put
individual conscience and individual judgment in the first place."'"
In the second of the cases, Torcaso v. Watkins," the Court's opinion
was written by Justice Black, the author of the opinions in Everson and
McCollum. In invalidating under the first amendment a state require-
ment that holders of public office qualify by taking an oath expressing
their belief in the existence of God, Justice Black again reiterated in fall
the definitive Everson-McCollum paragraph. He pointed out that al-
though in McCollum the Court had been urged to repudiate the para-
graph as dictum, it "declined to do this, but instead strongly reaffirmed
what had been said in Everson, calling attention to the fact that both the
majority and the minority in Everson had agreed on the principles de-
clared in this part of the Everson opinion."' 4 Referring specifically to
the court below but undoubtedly having in mind also many others, he
stated:
The Maryland Court of Appeals thought, and it is argued here, that this
Court's later holding and opinion in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 US. 306,
... had in part repudiated the statement in the Everson opinion quoted
above and previously reaffirmed in McCollm. But the Court's opinion
in Zorach specifically stated: "We follow the McCollum case."'1
While the decision in Torcaso v. Watkins was unanimous, Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan concurred only in the result.'6  The same two
Justices had joined in a separate concurring opinion in McGowan v.
Maryland, and the former (Justice Harlan was not yet then on the
9. Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
10. 366 U.S. 420 (1961), discussed more fully below, pp. 25-30.
11. Id. at 443.
12. Id. at 563.
13. 367 U.S. 488 (1961), discussed more fully below, pp. 30-32.
14. Id. at 493.
15. Id. at 494.
16. 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961).
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Bench) had concurred specially in McCollum and had dissented in Ever-
son. Thus, neither of these two Justices have ever specifically endorsed
the Everson-McCollum paragraph. Nevertheless, Justice tFrankfurter
could hardly have dissented in both Everson and Zorach without at least
having accepted the substance of the paragraph; indeed, the burden of the
dissent in Zorach was that the majority there had refused to apply what
was logically required by McCollum. Justice Frankfurter himself said
in his dissent in Zorach that the "result in the McCollum case... was
based on principles that received unanimous acceptance by this Court,
barring only a single vote."17
Nor can one justify the concurrence by Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan in the result in Torcaso except on the basis of the substance of
the Everson-McCollum interpretation of the first amendment. It is true
that the appellant's brief in Torcaso also invoked the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment, but in the Sunday Law Cases Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan accorded to states almost unlimited discretionary
judgment in making legislative classifications under that clause. 8 Since
it is hardly possible to assume that such discretionary judgment would not
encompass a differentiation between believers and non-believers in the
appointment of notaries empowered to administer oaths, the concurrence
of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in Torcaso may be explained only on the
ground that they interpreted the first amendment as barring government
from making such a differentiation in according governmental benefits.
It is therefore safe to say that the interpretation of the first amend-
ment contained in the Everson-McCollum paragraph reflects the views
of every member of the present Court. It must be remembered, too, that
only three of the Justices who participated in Everson and McCollum
(Black, Frankfurter and Douglas) are still on the Court and that the
Sunday Law Cases and Torcaso v. Watkins were passed upon by six new
Justices, all of whom now indicate their concurrence in the Everson-
McCollum interpretation of the first amendment. It may therefore be
hoped that in view of this latest expression of the Court, two-thirds of
whose members were appointed after the Everson and McCollum deci-
sions, the issue will be put to rest and it will be accepted by all that the
first amendment is to be broadly interpreted as barring not only preferen-
tial aid but all aid to religion and as erecting a wall of separation between
church and state.'9
17. 343 U.S. 306, 322 (1952). Justice Reed dissented in McCollum. 333 U.S. 203, 238.
18. See the long separate opinion of Justice Frankfurter in which Justice Harlan joined.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459 (1961).
19. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), wherein the Court pointed out (at p. 19) that
the three Justices appointed after Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), concurred
in the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment (as barring racial segregation in public
schools) set forth in that case.
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FEDERAL Am To PARocHIAL SCHOOLS
The relevance of the meaning of the establishment clause to the cur-
rent controversy regarding the inclusion of parochial schools in a pro-
gram of federal aid for public schools is quite apparent.2" If the clause
is interpreted as barring only preferential governmental aid to religion,
obviously no constitutional barrier precludes the granting of federal funds
to religious schools of all faiths so long as no sect is favored and none
discriminated against. Indeed, some proponents of federal aid for paro-
chial schools, acting on the assumption that the Everson-McCollum in-
terpretation has been vitiated by Zorach, took this approach. But the
opinions in McGowan v. Maryland and Torcaso v. Watkins seem now to
foreclose it.
Perhaps because of this, the emphasis on the part of the proponents
of federal aid to parochial schools has shifted from the establishment
clause to the free exercise clause. The claim is that the exclusion of
parochial schools from a program of federal aid to public schools in-
fringes upon religious liberty. The argument in support of this claim
runs something like the following.
In 1925, in the case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters," the Supreme
Court ruled that it would be an infringement upon the religious liberty
of Catholic parents to compel them to send their children to public
schools in violation of their conscience. However, many Catholic parents
cannot afford to pay the tuition required to keep their children in paro-
chial schools in addition to the taxes they pay to maintain the public
schools. Hence, unless the government, by granting financial aid to the
parochial schools, makes it economically feasible for the parents to send
their children to such schools, the guaranty of religious liberty declared
in the Pierce case becomes a vain and empty promise. Exercise of re-
ligion which is financially prohibitive, it is asserted, cannot be called the
free exercise of religion.
Before considering the merits of this claim, a word should be said
regarding its implications. By virtue of the fourteenth amendment the
free exercise clause is as applicable to the states as it is to the federal gov-
ernment." Moreover, compulsory school attendance laws are not federal
but state laws, and it is the states that finance public education. If the
interpretation of the free exercise clause given in the preceding para-
graph is correct, then it follows that the support of parochial schools out
20. The controversy is hardly a new one. For discussions of earlier phases see PFFFER,
CHjRcH, STATE AND FREEDOm 478-94 (1953); Mitchell, Religion and Federal Aid to Educa-
tion, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 113 (1949).
21. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
22. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940).
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of tax-raised funds is not merely a right of the states but a constitutional'
obligation, at least so long as the states retain their compulsory school at-
tendance laws and maintain public schools out of tax-raised funds.
The religious liberty claim rests on a premise often asserted by many
who contested the broad interpretation of the establishment clause ex-
pressed in Everson and McCollum. The premise is that the establish-
ment and free exercise commands are not mandates of equal value. The
principal intent of the fathers of the Bill of Rights was to secure religious
freedom, and the prohibition of establishment was inserted merely as a
means to assure that freedom.24 Accordingly, should there be an occasion
where strict adherence to separation would infringe upon religious free-
dom, the former must yield to the latter, else the end would be sacrificed
for the means. It follows from this that even if federal aid to parochial
schools would not be consistent with the establishment clause, at least as
interpreted in E'erson-McCollua, it is constitutionally permitted, if not
required.
I find nothing in American constitutional history or tradition to jus-
tify an apportionment of values between separation of church and state
and religious liberty or indeed to justify the dichotomy itself. The strug-
gle for religious freedom and for disestablishment were parts of the same
single evolutionary process that culminated in the first amendment. Long
before Everson and McCollum, Professor Ruffini noted that "religious
liberty and separation have become in America two terms which, ideally,
historically and practically, are inseparable."2 In his dissent in Everson,
Justice Rutledge expressed the same thought: '"Establishment' and 'free
exercise' were correlative and coextensive ideas, representing only differ-
ent facets of the single great and fundamental freedom. 2
In the first of the Sunday Law Cases decided in the past term of the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority of the
Court, rejects the contention that "the purpose of the 'establishment'
clause is only to insure protection for the 'free exercise' of religion," and
that it has no independent force of its own. "The writings of Madison:'
he said, "who was the First Amendments architect, demonstrated that the
establishment of religion was equally feared because of its tendencies to
23. In Everson the Court stated that it did "not mean to intimate that a state could not
provide transporation only to children attending public schools." 330 U.S. 1, 16. See Con-
nell v. Board of School Directors, 356 Pa. 585, 52 A.2d 580 (1947), affirming the judgment
of the court below. See also PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 477-78 (1953).
24. Murray, Law or Prepossession?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 32 (1949); PARSON,
THm FiRsT FREEom 28-29 (1948); Reed, Separation of Church and State - Its Real Mean-
ing, Catholic Action, March, 1949, p. 9; Katz, The Case for Religious Liberty, in RELIGION
IN AmmRICA 95 (Cogley ed. 1958).
25. RUPIrnw, RELIGIOUS LmRnn 16 (1912).
26. 330 U.S. 1, 40. For further discussion of this point see Pfeffer, The Case for Separation,
in R1ELIGION IN ANMRICA 52 (Cogley ed. 1958).
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political tyranny and subversion of civil authority." 7  This means that
government conduct, federal or state, which impairs the separation of
church and state is unconstitutional, even if it does not appear to infringe
upon the free exercise of religion.
However, completely aside from any supposed conflict between sepa-
ration and free exercise in respect to federal aid to education, I find it
difficult to grasp the reasoning behind the claim that exclusion of paro-
chial schools from the program infringes upon religious freedom. If the
right of Catholic parents to send their children to parochial rather than
public schools is a constitutionally-protected exercise of freedom of re-
ligion it is so only because the Supreme Court has so held in the Pierce
case, since under our system of government the Supreme Court is the
final authority on constitutional rights.2" But the same Supreme Court
which in 1925 held in the Pierce case that the State of Oregon could not
compel parents to send their children exclusively to public schools also
held in Everson in 1947, McCollum in 1948, and Zorach in 1952, that
the government may not finance religious schools or religious education.
If the latter three decisions are inconsistent with the former, then it would
seem that they have overruled it, not only because they are three decisions
against one, but because they are later decisions and therefore supersede
earlier inconsistent ones.
Of course, the Pierce case has not been overruled or superseded and
remains today sound constitutional law. But the reason for this is simply
that it is not inconsistent with the Everson-McCollum-Zorach principle
that the government may not finance church schools. It is one thing to
say that religious liberty forbids the government from dosing down
church schools, as the Oregon legislature sought to do in the Pierce case;
it is something entirely different to say that religious liberty also requires
the government to finance these schools.
In the late 1930's and early 194 0's the Supreme Court ruled in a
number of cases that the states could not ban distribution of literature by
the Jehovah's Witnesses even though the literature violently attacked the
Catholic Church and the Catholic religion. The Court held that the Wit-
nesses were exercising their religious liberty.2" But can it be seriously
contended that the Jehovah's Witnesses could demand that the govern-
ment print its literature - or, to make the analogy even closer, give them
money so that they could buy and maintain printing presses because they
were not satisfied with the government presses?
27. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 440 (1961).
28. Every claim of religious liberty in respect to federal aid to education that I have come
across rests exclusively on the Pierce case.
29. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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True enough, there is no compulsion, other than that of conscience,
in the Jehovah's Witnesses' distribution of their literature whereas there
is compulsion to secure for one's children a minimum secular education."
However, this is hardly a critical distinction. During the past decade
there has been a growing movement to fluoridate the water supply in
order to protect the teeth of our children. Many municipalities have en-
gaged in the program. But drinking fluoridated water violates the con-
science of Christian Scientists. A number of suits have been brought to
stop the program, but all have proved unsuccessful and the Supreme
Court has refused to interfere with these decisions.8 ' It would undoubt-
edly be a great expense for Christian Scientists living in communities with
a fluoridated water supply to purchase unfluoridated water as required by
their conscience. Yet I have not come across a single report of a demand
by Christian Scientists that the government give them money so that they
can buy such water and thus be economically able to exercise their free-
dom of religion. I doubt very much that, if such a demand were made,
serious consideration would be given to it by the courts.
It is important to note that religious liberty was not the only liberty
implicit in the Pierce case. (Indeed the claim of infringement of re-
ligious liberty was not raised by the parties, nor is "religious liberty" or
"freedom of religion" or a similar phrase even mentioned in the opinion.)
What is commonly referred to as the Pierce case involved two separate
cases concerning two separate schools. One was a Catholic parochial
school conducted by the Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus
and Mary. The other was the Hill Military Academy in which, as far
as the record shows, not even the Lord's Prayer was recited. A single
judgment was issued in both cases and a single opinion written to cover
both cases. The Court quite dearly decided that a parent who is not in
the least motivated by religious consideration has an equal constitutional
right to send his child to a private secular rather than public school. Can
it be said that in such a case he is being deprived of religious liberty if
the state does not give him the money he needs to send his child to a
private secular school? Obviously not, and the reason is simply that it is
no deprivation of religious liberty for the government not to finance a
competing educational system, whether it be religious or secular.
There is a religious liberty issue in the question of federal aid for paro-
chial schools, but it is one very much different from that asserted by the
30. See People v. Donner, 199 Misc. 643, 99 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950), affd, 278
App. Div. 705, 103 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1951), af-'d, 302 N.Y. 857, 100 N.B.2d. 48 (1951),
appeal dismrissed for want of a substantial federal issue, 342 U.S. 884 (1951).
31. Birnel v. Town of Fircrest, 361 US.. 10 (1959), dismissing for want of a substantial fed-
eral issue 53 Wash. 2d 830, 335 P.2d 819 (1959); Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 351 U.S. 935
(1956), dismissing for want of a substantial federal issue 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 NB.2d 609
(1955).
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proponents of such aid. Rather than religious liberty being infringed
upon by the exclusion of parochial schools from federal aid, the reverse
is closer to the truth. The most serious infringement upon religious lib-
erty before our Bill of Rights was adopted was the use of tax-raised funds
for religious purposes. In the great Virginia Statute establishing religious
freedom32 it was eloquently stated that "to compel a man to furnish con-
tributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves
is sinful and tyrannical." Is it not a violation of the religious liberty of
Catholics to compel them to pay for the propagation of the faith of
Jehovah's Witnesses, or a violation of the religious liberty of Jehovah's
Witnesses to compel them to pay for the propagation of the Catholic
faith? And is this not exactly what happens when tax-raised funds are
used to finance church schools?
THE BIBLE IN THE SCHOOLS
The Procedural Issue: Standing To Bring Suit
Twice during its past term the Supreme Court has again shown that
it is rarely possible to force it to pass on an issue when a majority of the
Court does not want to do so. 3 In 1943, the Court dismissed for want
of standing a suit brought by a physician challenging Connecticut's anti-
birth control law.34 Learning the lesson of that decision, the law and
medical faculties of Yale University conspired to compel the Court to
pass on the issue by making sure that the plaintiffs' standing to sue could
not be successfully challenged. Accordingly, suit (for declaratory judg-
ment) was brought not only on behalf of a physician (head of the de-
partment of gynecology at Yale Medical School) but also on behalf of
two married couples who alleged that contraceptive treatment was neces-
sary in the one case to prevent birth of infants with congenital abnormal-
ities and in the other to prevent probable loss of the wife's life should
she become pregnant. But, alas, all this was to no avail. A majority of
the Court held that since the statute was actually not enforced and con-
traceptive treatment and devices are freely available in Connecticut with-
out "realistic fear of prosecution," there was no real or substantial contro-
versy for the Court to adjudicate.35
A Pennsylvania citizen seeking a Supreme Court determination of a
Bible reading statute was no more successful. In 1952 the Court had dis-
32. 12 Laws of Va. 80 (Hening 1823).
33. Or to prevent it from passing on an issue when it does want to. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
34. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), would have constituted adequate precedent for accepting jurisdiction had the court
wished to do so.
35. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). (Attorney for the plaintiffs was Professor Fow-
ler Harper of the Yale Law School.)
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missed an appeal from a New Jersey Supreme Court decision upholding
a statute providing for daily Bible reading in the public schools, on the
ground that the plaintiff had lost his standing by reason of the fact that
his child had graduated from school by the time the appeal reached the
Supreme Court." For this reason, the Pennsylvania plaintiff, also having
learned the lesson, brought his suit while his children were in the lower
grades in school, so that notwithstanding the law's delays, they would
still be in school by the time the case reached the Supreme Court.
The plaintiff was successful in the lower court. In Schempp v. School
District of Abington Township," a three-judge Federal District Court
ruled the statute unconstitutional. An appeal was taken by the school
board to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending, the Penn-
sylvania legislature amended the statute so as to provide that any child
bringing a written request from his parent was to be excused from par-
ticipating in the Bible reading exercise." On the basis of this amend-
ment the school board moved the District Court to vacate the judgment
(enjoining the practices complained of) and to dismiss the complaint for
mootness. The District Court ruled, however, that since an appeal had
already been commenced, it had no further jurisdiction. 9 The Supreme
Court, however, granted the motion to the extent of vacating the judg-
ment and remanding the suit to the District Court for further proceedings
in the light of the statutory amendment.4"
An amendment to a statute declared unconstitutional should not moot
the (injunction) judgment unless the amendment is truly material, i.e.,
unless it is probable that the judgment would have been different had the
amendment antedated the suit, else a legislature could abort the judgment
by repeated enactment of inconsequential amendments. The amendment
to the Pennsylvania statute is relevant to the issue of compulsion versus
voluntariness; but how critical was that issue to the ultimate determina-
tion of the suit?
The Substantive Issue: The Bible, the Schools, and the
Establishment Clause
The complaint in the Schempp suit attacked the Bible reading prac-
tices under both the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment. While the issue of voluntariness versus compulsion was no
doubt relevant in respect to the attack on the practices under the free ex-
36. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
37. 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
38. Act No. 700, laws of General Assembly of Pennsylvania, approved Dec. 17, 1959; see
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 15-1516 (Supp. 1960).
39. Schempp v. School District, 184 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
40. School District v. Schempp, 364 U.S. 298 (1960).
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ercise aspect of the case, it was hardly relevant in respect to the establish-
ment aspect. Here the critical test is not compulsion (although in re-
spect to religious practices or teachings compulsion would violate the es-
tablishment ban as well as the free exercise guaranty), but state aid to
religion. Hence, even if pupil participation in the religious practices
were entirely voluntary, the first amendment's ban on establishment
would still be violated by the aid accorded religion by the state through
its public school system and by state participation in religious affairs.
This was stated in the Supreme Court's opinion in McCollum. There
the Court said: 1
Appellant, taking issue with the facts found by the Illinois courts, argues
that the religious education program in question is invalid under the
Federal Constitution for any of the following reasons: ... (2) the re-
ligious education program was voluntary in name only because in fact
subtle pressures were brought to bear on the students to force them to
participate in it ....
In view of our decision we find it unnecessary to consider these argu-
ments or the disputed facts upon which they depend.
This is the dear, unambiguous opinion of the majority of the Supreme
Court. It held that the involvement by the Champaign public school
authorities in religious education and practices was unconstitutional
whether pupil participation was in fact voluntary or involuntary. The
reason for this is that the Court found the Champaign program unconsti-
tutional under the establishment ban and therefore did not find it neces-
sary to consider the free exercise guaranty.
In the Schempp case the District Court first invalidated the Pennsyl-
vania statute on the ground that it violated the establishment clause as
interpreted in Everson and McCollum. "In our view," the court said, "in-
asmuch as the Bible deals with man's relationship to God and the Penn-
sylvania statute may require a daily reminder of that relationship, the
statute aids all religions. Inasmuch as the 'Holy Bible' is a Christian
document, the practice aids and prefers the Christian religion."'42 Thus
the court found an even greater violation of the establishment clause than
in the McCollum case, for it found that the statute aided all religions and
also preferred the Christian religion, whereas in the McCollum case the
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to pass on the claim of preferential
treatment to a particular faith.4"
Had the District Court possessed prophetic vision it may well have
stopped at that point. However, in an effort to make assurance triply
sure (it had already made it doubly sure by adding the preference find-
ing) it held that the statute also violated the free exercise mandate. Even
41. 333 U.S. 203, 207.
42. 177 F. Supp. 398, 405 (1959).
43. 333 U.S. 203, 207.
[Vol. 13:1
Pfeffer, Church and State
if this is not to be deemed a subsidiary holding, it is certainly an indepen-
dent one and one dearly not necessary to the District Court's judgment.
For my part, I find it difficult to understand the Supreme Court's ac-
tion except in terms of a wish to avoid or at least delay deciding the issue
on the merits. 4 However, the issue is on its way up to the Court in a
case decided earlier this year by a trial court in Miami, Florida 5 There
the trial court upheld a Bible reading statute on the basis of a school
board policy (not expressly authorized in the statute) to excuse from at-
tendance children whose parents so request. Either by express statutory
provision or by school regulation or policy, this is probably universal
practice in American public schools, not only in respect to Bible reading
but all religious practices and instruction. ' Hence, it is important that
the issue be decided by the Supreme Court, and it is perhaps worthwhile
that something more be said of it here.
The definitive interpretation of the establishment clause in Everson
and McCollum makes it dear that compulsion may effect a violation of
that clause as well as of the free exercise dause.47 But not all compul-
sion necessarily violates the establishment ban; there are certain types of
compulsion which will not constitute a law respecting an establishment
of religion, and yet constitute one prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The test, as elicited from the relevant Supreme Court decisions ap-
pears to be as follows: If compulsion is exercised to impel participation
in religious conduct, it constitutes a law respecting an establishment of
religion as well as one prohibiting the free exercise thereof. If, on the
other hand, it impels participation in secular conduct, it can only be a law
prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
Thus, as the Everson and McCollu= cases state, it would be a viola-
don of the establishment ban to "force... a person to go to... church
... or... to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Going to
church and professing belief in religion are obviously religious acts and
44. The court might have disposed of the case on the basis of federal abstention until the
statute had been challenged in the state courts. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167
(1959). This may yet be the fate of the suit should the District Court stick to its judgment.
45. Actually two cases, consolidated for trial and appealed jointly. Chamberlain v. Board
of Pub. Instruction, Civ. No. 59-4928, and Resnick v. Board of Pub. Instruction, Civ. No.
59-8873, Cir. Ct., Fla., 11th Cir.
46. In the Miami case the policy of excusing children applied to all religious practices and
instruction. Nevertheless, the trial court enjoined the showing of religious films to public
school children during school hours, the presentation of Christmas, Easter and Hanukkah cere-
monies containing religious elements, and the use of public school premises for religious in-
struction after school hours.
47. '"Neither a state nor the Federal Government... can force nor influence a person to go to
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance.. 330 U.S. 1, 15; 333 U.S. 203, 210.
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coerced participation establishes religion no less than it prohibits its free
exercise.
On the other hand, non-polygamous marriages,48 military training
and bearing arms in defense of the nation in wartime,9 vaccination to
prevent the spread of communicable disease," and saluting the flag and
pledging allegiance to it,5 are all deemed by the general community and
the courts to be secular rather than religious conduct, and compulsory
participation therein does not violate the ban on establishment of re-
ligion, although it may (or may not) violate the ban on laws prohibiting
the free exercise of religion.
The distinction is a critical one. For if the act is secular it is within
the constitutional competence of the state, and therefore the sole ques-
tion remaining is whether a particular religiously-motivated person has
a constitutional right under the free exercise clause to be excused from
participating therein. (This, according to the Court's decisions, depends
upon the balancing of the secular needs of the community against the
religious rights of the individual.) On the other hand, if the conduct is
religious, then it is outside the competence and jurisdiction of the state
or its instrumentalities, and even if participation were not compulsory,
the conduct would be unconstitutional.
It follows from this that the appropriate judicial remedy will differ
in the two types of cases. If only free exercise is involved because the
conduct in question is secular, the sole right of the religiously-motivated
dissenter is to be excused from participation, but not to have the practice
terminated. Conversely, if establishment is involved because the conduct
in question is religious, the constitutional redress is not to excuse the
dissenter but to discontinue the practice (for the state has no constitu-
tional power to enter into it in the first place.)
An examination of the Barnette, Everson, McCollum and Zorach
cases will illustrate this distinction. In West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,52 the Supreme Court held that children of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses could not be compelled by public school authorities to
participate in the flag salute ceremony. Such coercion, it was held, pro-
hibited the free exercise of their religion in a manner forbidden by the
Constitution. Since, however, the ceremony is generally deemed a patri-
otic or secular one, rather than a religious one, there was no suggestion
that the public school authorities were required to discontinue it as part
of the regular public school program.
48. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
49. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293
U.S. 245 (1934); Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
50. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
51. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
52. Ibid.
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In Everson, the Court by a vote of five to four upheld the use of
public funds to transport children by bus to private and parochial schools.
The majority held that this was secular conduct whose purpose it was to
protect children from the hazards of the road. (The Court interpreted
the challenged statute to apply to all private schools, secular as well as
religious.) Hence, there was no violation of the establishment ban, even
though the public funds so expended were raised by compulsory taxation
of citizens.
In McCollum, the conduct complained of was clearly religious. Hence,
the Court did not issue a judgment which would simply have secured
the right of the plaintiff's child not to participate therein, but decreed
that the conduct should be discontinued and eliminated.
In Zorach, a majority of the Court held that the gravamen of the
plaintiffs' complaint was that public school sessions continued while off-
premises religious instruction was taking place. Under this analysis of
the case, the Court majority held that there was no violation of the
establishment ban since the conduct - continuation of secular instruc-
tion - was purely non-religious.
Religion may itself be the subject of secular instruction. Nothing
in the first amendment or in the Everson-McCollum interpretation there-
of requires the complete exclusion of religion or references to God from
the public schools. The first amendment is not violated if, for example,
the Bible is studied in the public schools as a work of literature, or Han-
del's Messiah as a work of music, or The Last Supper as a work of art
Nor can it be contended that the influence of religion and religious
institutions upon history may not be studied in the public schools. No
violation of the establishment ban is involved in any of these since litera-
ture, music, art, and history are all secular subjects properly within the
competence of the public school teaching authorities.
What is unconstitutional is the inculcation of religious beliefs or the
conducting of religious programs. It is constitutional to study the Bible
as a work of literature; it is, I believe, unconstitutional to read it as an
act of devotion. If the approach to the Bible or religious music or art
is one of intellectual study, it is proper in the public schools; if the ap-
proach is one of worship or faith, it belongs in the home, church, or
synagogue.
This distinction is implicit in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
the McCollum case. Agreeing with the Court's decision that released
time classes on public school premises were unconstitutional, he warned
against complete exclusion of religion from the curriculum, saying:"
Perhaps subjects such as mathematics, physics or chemistry are, or can
be, completely secularized. But it would not seem practical to teach
53. 333 U.S. 203, 235-36.
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either practice or appreciation of the arts if we are to forbid exposure of
youth to any religious influences. Music without sacred music, architec-
ture minus the cathedral, or painting without the scriptural themes
would be eccentric and incomplete, even from a secular point of view.
Yet the inspirational appeal of religion in these guises is often stronger
than in forthright sermon. Even such a "science" as biology raises the
issue between evolution and creation as an explanation of our presence
on this planet. Certainly a course in English literature that omitted
the Bible and other powerful uses of our mother tongue for religious
ends would be pretty barren. And I should suppose it is a proper, if not
an indispensable, part of preparation for a worldly life to know the roles
that religion and religions have played in the tragic story of man-
kind. . . One can hardly respect a system of education that would
leave the student wholly ignorant of the currents of religious thought
that move the world society for a part in which he is being prepared.
Because he feared that the scope of the Court's mandate might be
construed to cast doubt upon the constitutionality of such inclusion of
religion in the public school curriculum, Justice Jackson found it neces-
sary to write a concurring opinion. However, as far as the basic prob-
lem of religious indoctrination or worship was concerned, he was com-
pletely in accord with the other seven Justices. Indeed, the subsequent
Zorach case indicates that he would even have gone further, for there
he dissented from a majority opinion which permitted off-school released
time programs.
It is probable, too, that it was to this type of religious matter in the
public school that Justice Jackson was referring in his remark that "it may
be doubted whether the Constitution, which, of course, protects the
right to dissent, can be construed also to protect one from the embarrass-
ment that always attends nonconformity in religion, politics, behavior or
dress."5  A Jehovah's Witness child who refuses to salute the flag or
pledge allegiance to it (Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion in
the Barnette case), a Christian Scientist child who refuses to attend the
biology class, or a Jewish child who stays away from school on his re-
ligious holiday, may all suffer some embarrassment because of their
exercise of their constitutionally-protected right of religious noncon-
formity. But since flag saluting, biology, and general public school
studies are all acts of secular conduct on the part of the public school
authorities, there is no establishment of religion involved and hence no
right to require the school authorities to eliminate the flag salute cere-
mony, drop the biology course or close the public schools on the Jewish
Day of Atonement. Where, however, the conduct complained of is
religious - as in the McCollum case and in the Schempp case - there
is a constitutional right to a discontinuance of that conduct. This is
what Justice Jackson intended - else he would not have concurred in
the decision in McCollum but would have vigorously dissented.
54. Id. at 233.
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THE SUNDAY LAW CASES
In 1951 the author of this article appealed to the Supreme Court on
behalf of two small Orthodox Jewish merchants who had been prose-
cuted for violating the New York Sunday dosing law. The basis of
the appeal was that the law violated the establishment clause of the
first amendment, infringed upon the defendants' freedom of religion,
particularly since their religious conscience compelled them to refrain
from business on Saturday, and denied them the equal protection of the
laws by reason of lack of any reasonable justification for the classification
of businesses permitted or forbidden to operate on Sunday. In Friedman
v. New York, 5 it took the Court but one brief sentence to dispose of all
the defendants' contentions: "Appeal dismissed for the want of a sub-
stantial federal issue." A decade later, during its past term, it took the
Court 107 pages of the Supreme Court Reporter" to pass upon the same
contentions. But the net result was exactly the same: the contentions
were overruled and the statutes upheld.
All in all, four cases were before the Court in this term. Two of
them, McGowan v. Maryland" and Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,
Inc. v. McGinley, 8 concerned owners of highway discount department
stores which were open for business seven days a week. The other two,
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts59 and Braun-
feld v. Brown,"0 concerned stores owned (as in the Friedman case) by
Orthodox Jews who abstained from all business activities on Saturdays.
The four cases involved three statutes - those of Maryland, Massa-
chusetts and Pennsylvania. As has been indicated, all the statutes were
attacked on three principal grounds: (1) that Sunday laws violate the
constitutional prohibition against establishment of religion; (2) that
they violate the constitutional protection of religious liberty; and (3)
that they deny to the merchants equal protection of the laws in violation
of the fourteenth amendment.
The two cases involving the discount houses were decided by a vote
of eight to one, with only Justice Douglas voting to declare the statutes
unconstitutional as to all parties. In the two cases involving the Jewish
Sabbath observers, Justices Brennan and Stewart also dissented and joined
Douglas in voting to declare the laws unconstitutional as against the
Jewish Sabbath observers.
In all four cases the prevailing opinions were written by Chief Justice
55. 341 U.S. 907 (1951).
56. Vol. 81, pp. 1122-1229.
57. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
58. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
59. 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
60. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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Warren. In meeting the attack based upon the principle of separation
of church and state he said that if the present purpose of a Sunday law
is to use the state's coercive power to aid religion it would be unconsti-
tutional and in violation of the no establishment clause of the first amend-
ment. He conceded further that this indeed was the original purpose of
the three Sunday laws under attack. There was no question, he said,
that historically these Sunday laws were enacted during colonial times
as religious laws whose purpose was to insure the observance of the
Christian Sabbath as a religious obligation. However, he held, the reli-
gious origin of these statutes did not require that they be held invalid
today, if in fact, the religious purpose was no longer in effect.
This, he said, was the case in respect to these laws. The present pur-
pose of the legislature is to set aside a day not for religious observance,
but for rest, relaxation, and family togetherness, and the motivation is
therefore secular rather than religious. As evidence to support this con-
clusion the Chief Juistice pointed out, for example, that the Maryland
statute permits such Sunday activities as the operation of bathing beaches,
amusement parks and even pin ball and slot machines as well as the sale
of alcoholic beverages and the performance of professional sports. Such
exemptions from the law obviously are directly contrary to the religious
purpose of the Sabbath and thus indicate clearly that the present purpose
of the statutes is not religious but secular.61
Since these are today welfare or secular statutes, the fact that to a
certain extent their operation coincides with religious purposes does not
make them religious laws, according to the Chief Justice. In this respect,
he referred to the Everson case in which the use of public funds to trans-
port children to parochial schools was upheld. The purpose of that
statute, the Chief Justice said, was to protect children from the hazards
of traffic and the fact that indirectly the parochial schools benefited
thereby did not transform what was basically a secular or welfare law
into a prohibited law respecting an establishment of religion. For the
same reason, he said, the fact that the Christian religion may benefit by
the state's decision to choose Sunday as the day in which people are
required to abstain from labor and to rest and relax, does not transform
these purely secular and welfare laws into laws prohibited by the first
amendment.
With the exception of Justice Douglas, all of the members of the
Court also rejected the claim of the two discount houses that the Sunday
laws violated their religious liberty. The Chief Justice asserted that the
61. Perhaps it indicates only that Catholic concepts of proper Sabbath observance have dis-
placed those of Puritan Protestantism, as they have done in respect to consumption of intoxi-
cating liquors and are doing in respect to bingo and other forms of gambling. See PFEFFER,
CRUEDS 1N COMPETITION 93-111 (1958).
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discount houses could not even raise the issue of religious liberty. They
alleged only economic injury, not any infringement of their own religious
freedoms due to Sunday closings; in fact, there was nothing in the record
to show what their religious beliefs were.
The Court did concede that the Jewish Sabbath observers had stand-
ing to assert violation of religious freedom since the operation of the
compulsory Sunday law hindered their observance of their own Sabbath
by imposing upon them an economic hardship. Nevertheless, six of the
nine Justices held that the statutes were constitutional even as against
the Jewish merchants."
The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions, the Chief Justice
said, is absolute. However, he continued, what was involved in the
present cases is not freedom to hold religious beliefs or opinions but
freedom to act, and such freedom, even when motivated by religious con-
victions, is not totally free from legislative restrictions. Thus, for ex-
ample, the fact that polygamy may be a positive command of the Mormon
religion does not prevent the government from declaring it illegal and
making its practice criminal. " Similarly, the Court in the past had up-
held a statute making it a crime for a girl under the age of eighteen
years to sell newspapers or periodicals in public despite the fact that a
child of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith felt that it was her religious duty
to perform this work."
In the present case, Chief Justice Warren asserted that the statutes
did not even go as far as those involved in the polygamy and child labor
cases, for there they forbade conduct which religion commanded, whereas
the Jewish religion does not command engaging in business on Sunday.
The restriction on religious freedom is merely indirect and consequential
and the Court should not strike down what it found to be a welfare law
merely because of this indirect burden on the exercise of religion. "If
the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power,
the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals,
the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance un-
less a State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose
such a burden." 5
It was argued in the briefs that the States of Pennsylvania and Massa-
chusetts could in fact accomplish their purpose of securing one day rest
in every seven without imposing such a burden upon Sabbatarians. For
62. On this aspect of the case there was no single opinion representing the views of the ma-
jority of the Court, since Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart dissented, and Justices Frank-
furter and Harlan concurred in a separate opinion written by the former. There is, however,
no basic difference between the Chief Justices opinion and that of Justice Frankfurter.
63. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
64. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
65. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
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example, the state could enact a law, as many states have done, requiring
one day of rest each week for all workers but leaving it up to each
employer to decide which day shall be the day of rest. Or the state
could, as a number of states do in fact, designate Sunday as the day of
rest but provide an exemption for those whose religious convictions com-
pel them to observe a day other than Sunday as their day of rest. The
majority of the Court, however, rejected this argument stating that the
Court could not adjudge arbitrary and unreasonable the refusal of the
states to use this method of achieving their purpose."
The third ground upon which the Sunday law was challenged in all
the cases was that the crazy-quilt pattern of exclusions, exceptions, and
exemptions in the various statutes bore no semblance of reason and, being
arbitrary, constituted denial of due process and of the equal protection
of the laws. For example, in Massachusetts it is legal to sell fish and food-
stuffs at wholesale but not at retail; to dig for clams but not to dredge
oysters. In Pennsylvania it is permissible to fish on Sundays from
public waters but not on private property without the consent of the
owner. In Maryland merchandise customarily sold at beaches and amuse-
ment parks may be sold there on Sundays, but the same articles may not
be sold on Sundays in places other than beaches and amusement parks.
These and many other illustrations were cited to support the argument
that the Sunday laws are completely irrational and act unequally, all of
which make them unconstitutional and in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.
Justice Douglas did not address himself to this challenge, since he
held the statutes unconstitutional on the other grounds. All the other
Justices, however, considered the challenge and rejected it. The Chief
Justice's majority opinion reflects the almost unbroken practice of the
Supreme Court since the Roosevelt court reform campaign in 1937, not
to interfere with state social welfare legislation on the ground that it is
arbitrary or a deprivation of property without due process of law. Once
the Court determined that Sunday laws are not religious laws but social
welfare laws, it was almost inevitable that it would not interfere with
the legislature's discretion on which practices should be prohibited and
permitted in these laws. The Court felt that it could not say without a
shadow of doubt that there could be no reason or rationale underlying
the inclusions and exclusions of the various statutes.
Justices Brennan and Stewart dissented only in the two Sabbatarian
66. I find it difficult to reconcile Justice Black's concurrence in this aspect of the case with
his usual strong rejection of balancing in first amendment cases. See, e.g., his dissent in
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 415 (1961), in which he wrote that "where these
[first amendment] freedoms are left to depend upon a balance to be struck by this Court in
each particular case, liberty cannot survive. For under such a rule, there are no constitutional
rights that cannot be 'balanced' away." Id. at 423.
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cases,67 and in these only on the ground that the statutes unconstita-
tionally infringed upon the religious liberty of the Sabbatarians. Ac-
knowledging that the Sunday laws were in fact social welfare statutes,
they contended nevertheless, that they unnecessarily infringed upon the
constitutional rights of persons who observe a day other than Sunday as
their day of rest.
Writing for himself and Justice Stewart, Justice Brennan asserted
that "the values of the First Amendment, as embodied in the Fourteenth,
look primarily towards the preservation of personal liberty, rather than
towards the fulfillment of collective goals."68 A statute which infringes
upon personal liberty, particularly religious liberty, should be subject to
a far more exacting standard than is applied to a law which concerns
only economic interests. Religious freedom has classically been one of
the highest values of our society. He criticized what he believed was
the Court's action in holding that "any substantial state interest will
justify encroachments on religious practice, at least if those encroach-
ments are cloaked in the guise of some nonreligious public purpose."
The majority's sanctioning of the states' refusal to exempt Sabbatarians
merely because enforcement of the law might thereby be rendered some-
what more difficult exalts "administrative convenience to a level high
enough to justify making one religion economically disadvantageous.""
Justice Douglas dissented in all four cases and asserted that he deemed
the statutes unconstitutional both as an establishment of religion and as a
prohibition of the free exercise thereof.
Two years after the Court summarily dismissed the Friedman case,
I suggested, perhaps rashly, that this was not "the last word on the
question."' * I am prepared to be equally rash today and suggest that the
many, many words expended in the four cases before the Court in the
past term are also not the last words on the question.
The Court, it should be noted, did not completely close the door to
all judicial attacks on Sunday laws. The Chief Justice, speaking for the
majority, concluded one of the opinions with the statement:
We do not hold that Sunday legislation may not be a violation of the
"Establishmene' Clause if it can be demonstrated that its purpose -
evidenced either on the face of the legislation, in conjunction with its
legislative history, or in its operative effect - is to use the State's
coercive power to aid religion.1 '
While it is unlikely that the demonstration called for in this quota-
67. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610, 616 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher
Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617, 642 (1961).
68. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961).
69. Id. at 615-16.
70. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEOM 241 (1953).
71. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961).
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tion can be made to the Court's satisfaction in the proximate future,
nevertheless, the Court has left the door slightly ajar. If as may well be,
the Court will at some future time be prepared to invalidate Sunday laws,
it may, because of this sentence, be able to do so without repudiating
these decisions.
Or the end may come in another way. Undoubtedly, there will be
in the near future a spurt of legislative and administrative action to
enact new Sunday laws, strengthen those on the books, and institute more
vigorous enforcement. (This, in fact, has already begun.) Despite this,
the steady and almost uninterrupted trend of Sunday laws becoming dead-
letter laws will continue. The Supreme Court decisions may retard
somewhat this development but they will not be able to defeat it. The
social, cultural, political, and economic development of the American
society inevitably leads towards the ultimate discard of compulsory Sun-
day laws. It may be that the Court will finally dispose of this trouble-
some issue in the same way that it disposed of Connecticut's anti-birth
control law: it may find Sunday laws so dead that a formal death certifi-
cate by the Supreme Court will no longer be necessary.
RELIGIOUS TEST FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
"The Constitution is a purely secular document."7  From alpha, the
Preamble, to omega, the last operative clause, there is an unmistakable
intent to exclude religion. The Preamble sets forth the purposes for
which the new government is to be established, and they are all purely
secular purposes. God is not invoked in the Preamble nor mentioned in
the text of the Constitution. The only reference to religion in the Con-
stitution is found in the omega, and there with a wholly exclusionary in-
tent: "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any
office or public trust under the United States."73  In the last decision of
its 1960 Term the Supreme Court for the first time passed upon the ap-
plicability of that principle (although not the Constitutional provision
itself) to the states.74
The case involved a resident of Maryland who had been appointed
by the governor to the office of notary public but had been denied his
commission because he would not swear or declare his belief in the exist-
ence of God, as required by the Maryland constitution. The case almost
suffered the same fate as Doremus v. Board of Education,75 being mooted
on the eve of decision. During the course of argument for the appellee
(the State of Maryland) the state deputy attorney-general disclosed that
72. BEARD, THE REPUBLIc 165 (1943).
73. Art. VI, ci. 3.
74. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
75. 342 U.S. 429 (1952). See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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notary commissions in Maryland expire two years after appointment and
that the appointment of Roy Torcaso, the appellant, would expire the
following week. Nothing in the record gave any intimation of this
nor had the point been raised or briefed at any time."
Obviously troubled, the Chief Justice requested counsel for both sides
to submit by the end of the week briefs limited to the question whether
the case had been mooted. Counsel for Torcaso submitted a brief urging
that it had not and that Court should retain jurisdiction. Fortunately,
perhaps, the Court was not required to pass on the validity of counsel's
arguments, for the state's brief informed the Court on behalf of the
governor that in order to obtain its decision on the underlying issue
Torcaso would be reappointed for an additional two year term.
The governor's statement expressly stated the motivation for the
reappointment, and had the Court felt a need to avoid deciding the issue
it could have refused to decide the case, without extending unduly the
rationale of the birth control case,7" on the ground that the issue was now
feigned and not really adversary. However, the fact that the Court's
decision on the merits was unanimous (although Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan concurred only in the result) indicates quite dearly that no such
need was felt by the Court. In any event, after the state's supplemental
brief had been submitted, mootness did not again rear its unwelcome
head.
In the McCollum case, Justice Black noted that the judgment ap-
pealed from could not stand unless the Court was prepared to overrule
its interpretation of the establishment clause expressed in the Everson
case, and this the Court was not willing to do."B In the present case, it
was dear that the judgment appealed from could not stand unless the
force of Everson-McCollum had been vitiated by Zorach. As has been
indicated in the first part of this article, the Court was not willing so to
hold. The decision invalidating the Maryland oath requirement was the
necessary consequence of this refusal.
The Court's opinion ends (except for the sentence decreeing reversal
and remand) with the sentence: "This Maryland religious test for public
office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief and
religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him.'' "h This means
(unless the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment imposes
more stringent restraints upon the states than the first does on the federal
government, which is hardly likely) that the free exercise clause of the
76. This was also the case in Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
77. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). See text accompanying note 35 supra. Cf. Chi-
cago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892).
78. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948).
79. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961).
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first amendment encompasses non-belief as well as belief and secures the
free exercise of non-religion as well as of religion. 0 This need come as
no surprise inasmuch as the amendment's guaranty of freedom of speech
encompasses freedom of non-speech 8' as well as freedom of non-listen-
ing.a
2
This sentence raises another not insignificant, though still largely
inchoate conceptual question, that merits some comment. This concerns
the relationship between the establishment and free exercise clauses of
the first amendment, and has already in part been considered earlier in
this article.83 There are three ways of viewing this relationship: the es-
tablishment clause may be considered subsidiary and a means to the free
exercise guaranty, or it may be considered independent and of equal
weight, or the two may be considered unitary, two sides of the same coin,
as it were. The first view, as has been indicated, was rejected by the
Court in the first of the Sunday Law Cases by holding that while the ap-
pellant could not assert a claim of religious freedom it could assert a
claim of infringement of the establishment clause. In so holding the
Court adopted the second of these three views. The third view is im-
plicit in Justice Black's opinion for the Court in the Torcaso case. The
quoted last sentence, following as it does an opinion devoted to a discus-
sion of the meaning and applicability of the establishment clause, indi-
cates dearly, if not explicitly, that Justice Black, like Justice Rutledge,
considers establishment and free exercise as "correlative and coextensive
ideas, representing only different facets of the single great and funda-
mental freedom."84
There are practical as well as conceptual consequences to the Torcaso
decision. A number of other states in addition to Maryland have con-
stitutional provisions requiring an acknowledgment of a belief in God
in order to hold public office,85 and the decision of course nullifies these
80. See PFEFFER, CHURcH, STATE AND FREEDOM 498-99 (1953). But cf. PARSONS, THE
FIRST FRE3DOM 79 (1948), where it is said: "As for those who profess no religion, or who
repudiate religion, it is difficult to conceive how they can appeal to the first amendment, since
this document was solely concerned with religion itself, not its denial. By its very nature as
regards what it says about religion, they are outside its ken."
81. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also PFEFFER, THE LIBERTI S
OF AN AMERICAN 87-92 (1956).
82. See Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
83. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
84. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28, 40 (1947) (dissenting opinion). For sub-
stantially the same reason, the view is implicit in Justice Douglas' dissent in the Sunday Law
Cases, though in marked contrast to his statement in Zorach that it "takes obtuse reasoning to
inject any issue of the 'free exercise' of religion in the present case." 343 U.S. 306, 311. It
is also implicit in the Court's opinion in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94
(1952). But cf. Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of Liherty, 67 HARv. L. REv. 91
(1953).
85. ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 1; PA. CONsT. art. 1, § 4; TENN. CONST. art. 9, § 2.
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as well. It should - although it won't - lead to the amendment of
the many statutes, state and federal, which contain the phrase "so help
me God" in various prescribed oaths (although, of course, it would not
affect the right of any person to add the phrase if he wished). Finally,
it implicitly but necessarily invalidates any vestiges of statutory or judicial
procedure that disqualifies or permits the impeachment of witnesses on
grounds of religious disbelief.
